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Yellowknife evacuation emails show confusion, lack of planning

Cars leave Yellowknife for safety on August 16, 2023. Photo: Samantha Stuart
Cars leave Yellowknife for safety on August 16, 2023. Photo: Samantha Stuart

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Internal communications obtained by Cabin Radio reveal more of the chaos behind the scenes in the days leading up to and during Yellowknife’s evacuation.

The result of an access to information request, emails involving NWT government managers and staff help to illuminate some of the issues identified in a long-awaited territory-wide review of the 2023 wildfire season, which was published on Wednesday.

The emails indicate confusion, a lack of planning and poor communication regarding whether workers were considered essential or if they needed to work remotely, and how to keep Stanton Territorial Hospital’s emergency room open.

The emails also show increasing mistrust from residents as the territory struggled with internal and public communication.

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During the three-week evacuation of Yellowknife, Dettah and Ndılǫ, while patients at Stanton Territorial Hospital were moved outside the NWT, the emergency department remained open for essential workers and fire crews.

However, emails sent during the initial 48-hour evacuation period show there was concern the hospital would have to shut its doors completely.

An email marked “urgent” from Public Safety Canada on August 17 – the day after the evacuation was called – raised concern that there would be no health services available in Yellowknife. If so, the email stated, “high risk workers” like wildfire personnel would have to stop firefighting.

‘We may be unable to operate safely’

In another email sent the same day, an NWT Fire duty officer said they were told the hospital would close at noon on August 18 – the end of the evacuation period – and they were worried about “running into a situation where we may be unable to operate safely.”

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The NWT government then filed a humanitarian aid request to the federal government for military paramedics and assistance to keep the emergency room open.

“With the fire projected to reach Yellowknife on Saturday, could you please fast track these requests through your organization? Safety of our essential personnel is paramount and our response to the fire approaching Yellowknife is critical,” an email sent from the territorial government on August 17 stated.

Later that same day, Kimberly Riles – chief executive officer of the NWT’s health authority – said emergency services could, in fact, continue at Yellowknife’s hospital without federal help.

She wrote that private company Advanced Medical Solutions, or AMS, had agreed to maintain capacity in the emergency room and had recalled its most experienced expert in emergency medical service establishment. She added that if health authority staff were not available, AMS would assume full operational control of the hospital and if military medics were available to care for their own members, AMS would collaborate and work alongside them.

“As I’m sure folks can appreciate, our nurses and doctors are not typically called to work in zones deemed too dangerous for the general public and are seeking personal assurance of their safety in agreeing to do so,” Riles wrote.

Public Safety Canada ultimately dismissed the NWT’s request for humanitarian aid.

The after-action assessment noted the absence of a well-coordinated plan to evacuate Yellowknife’s hospital. Some staff were evacuated by mistake and had to be brought back to ensure essential medical services could continue.

“This lack of planning left healthcare infrastructure vulnerable at a time when it was critically needed,” the review stated.

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‘I didn’t hear any direction’

Emails obtained by Cabin Radio indicate broad confusion over who was considered an essential worker that needed to stay in Yellowknife.

In one email chain on August 17, an evacuating resource management officer at the Department of Environment and Climate Change wrote: “I didn’t hear any direction from the department on essential services or business continuity so instructed the rest of the staff at the North Slave regional office to do the same.”

A responding email indicated those were essential employees who were needed in Yellowknife to knock on doors and alert people to evacuate.

A separate email sent from Great Slave Helicopters, shortly after the evacuation order was issued on the evening of August 16, suggests the company – which was helping with firefighting efforts – was not told whether its staff were considered essential.

“I am assuming you want essential crew to stay in Yellowknife to fight the fires,” the email states.

“Typically in these instances, the fire division would provide the essential flight crew wrist bands so they can be identified in tow etc. Please advise asap any instructions for our essential crew remaining behind.”

Messages sent between NWT government communications staff in an “emergency comms” chat show at least one of those staff members was confused about when they should evacuate.

“At what point do we need contingency plans for all of us to cover work as people evac?” they questioned.

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“This is my first disaster: what is the protocol for us? Do we stay? Do we register? Do we wait and leave after everyone else?”

In other cases, essential workers had to be brought back to Yellowknife after they left the city.

In an email sent on August 18, Erin Kelly, then deputy environment minister, wrote that the department wanted food vendor and food service employees and “potentially some essential employees that left” to return to Yellowknife. She questioned if that could be done on the “back haul of evacuation flights.”

The after-action assessment found there was little direct communication with territorial staff to inform them of their roles during the wildfire crisis, leading to confusion over who was required to stay. While some essential personnel left, some non-essential workers stayed longer than needed.

“For those who stayed, there was no clear information on what was expected of them, where to report or how to coordinate with other departments,” the review stated.

“Of those who left, many did so out of fear and uncertainty and with unclear direction as to whether they would work remotely or would be off work completely.”

The review recommended that the NWT government establish a comprehensive list of essential staff and partners before an emergency happens to “ensure uninterrupted critical operations during crises.”

Remote work denied 12 hours before evacuation

While Yellowknife is where the majority of public sector employees live and work, officials with the NWT government appear not to have been considering remote work in the hours ahead of the city’s evacuation.

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On the morning of August 16, about 12 hours before the evacuation order was issued, Jayleen Robertson – an assistant deputy minister at the environment department – asked about getting approval to allow staff to work remotely. She wrote that several territorial employees were preparing to leave Yellowknife “to get their family out of the smoke and line of fire.”

A response attributed to a client service manager stated that only the deputy minister could approve out-of-territory remote work. The response added that the NWT government was not recommending remote work be approved at that time.

“Employees who choose to leave the territory when they are not subject to an order to evacuate would be required to take annual leave or lieu time,” she wrote.

“If you have any employees who are requesting to work out of territory due to smoke and the impact on a medical condition – we would need to explore through the duty to accommodate process.”

In a statement to Cabin Radio in October 2023, the NWT government said many of its “critical business functions” were up and running on August 21 and delivered by staff remotely.

All territorial departments partially or fully activated continuity plans following Yellowknife’s evacuation order, the government said. But the after-action review found an absence of a clear response and business continuity policy for territorial staff, with inconsistent approaches across departments.

That led to confusion over staff roles and whether they should work remotely during evacuations, the review’s authors stated, as well as “leadership attrition at pivotal moments.”

The review added that an absence of visible leadership “contributed to poor morale and operational challenges.”

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‘Increasingly irate calls’

The majority of emails obtained by Cabin Radio contained many questions from residents, MLAs and reporters. The messages highlight public confusion and concern over wildfires and evacuations, as well as some of the unique challenges people were facing.

Queries included whether highways were open, the status of various wildfires, how people could protect their properties, what resources were available to help people with disabilities evacuate, and if the territory had the firefighting resources it needed.

Government staff and officials worked to respond to those questions amid communications outages related to wildfire damage and instances where NWT websites and phone lines were down.

Several emails show increasing frustration among members of the public and waning trust in the NWT government.

One email a resident sent to NWT Fire on the evening of August 15 questioned why they had not received an update on the location of the fire headed toward Yellowknife.

“Surely with all the crews out there fighting the fire you could tell us if it has moved closer or not. It’s a matter of public safety. Yesterday it moved 10 kms in one day. The winds continued today,” they wrote.

Another email chain between NWT Fire staff on August 15 described “increasingly irate calls” from people concerned about the safety of Yellowknife, as well as social media posts “about government incompetence, lack of communication and overall lack of trust.”

“I’m hearing and seeing people making their own plans to self-evacuate,” one email stated.

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“I’m also getting calls from people who are in the south who are frustrated with how the government is handling the situation and basically threatening to return to the South Slave/Yellowknife regardless of advice.” 

The after-action assessment noted many residents expressed a lack of public trust in information provided by the NWT government.

Public communications from the territory were often inconsistent and there was limited transparency in decision-making. There was no whole-of-government crisis communications plan to guide messaging during the emergency.

As a result, the review found, many residents went elsewhere for information, in some cases leading to the spread of misinformation that often went unchallenged by official sources.

The review said, however, that the NWT government made some improvements in information-sharing during the wildfire response that reduced confusion over time.

‘Please give us time’

Those issues also extended to internal communications.

Messages sent in the “emergency comms” group chat on August 16 indicated frustration from government staff dealing with a deluge of questions from the public while lacking information on where to direct callers and what advice to give.

“Folks! Please respect that this EMO [Emergency Management Organization] team has been under a tremendous amount of pressure today to get this order out under the most unreasonable and unfortunate circumstances,” wrote Jennifer Young, then the director of corporate affairs for the Department of Municipal and Community Affairs.

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“I UNDERSTAND that you need a number. I UNDERSTAND that some things need to be fixed. I UNDERSTAND that there remain questions. We are under direction to remain here to get the best communications out that we can. Please give us time.”

There were also communication challenges between the NWT government and communities. The after-action assessment found, for example, that a lack of territorial consultation with the City of Yellowknife left the municipality scrambling to support the evacuation of residents.

“While the GNWT had the authority to make the call, the city was suddenly burdened with executing on-the-ground logistics without clear guidance or adequate preparation,” it states.

“This misalignment of responsibilities and communication channels delayed critical information and contributed to the already challenging conditions for those attempting to evacuate.

“Vulnerable populations – who needed the most straightforward and timely instructions – suffered the most from these gaps.”

A previous review of the City of Yellowknife’s response to the 2023 wildfires, released in July 2024, had identified issues with evacuation planning and the response at the municipal level, as well as flaws in cross-agency coordination.